It is back to the future in Middle East, with Turkey following the path of Egyp in 1950s. In 1955 a group of Egyptian officers -self-dubbed “Free Officer’s Movement”- took power after a coup and went on campaign of purge in military circles to solidify their hold on power and coup-proof Egyptian Armed Forces.
Free Officer’s practice of; Post-coup purges, attempting to replace lost expertise and competency with Russian weapons, and constant involvement in conflicts, looks eerily similar to what Turkey has been going through in the last three and a half years. It is almost like watching a remake of an old movie, for which you already know the tragic and devastating ending.
Post-2016 “coup” Turkish political leadership looks strikingly like the “Free Officer’s Movement” of Egypt, with Erdogan replacing the similarly built Gamel Abdel Nasr as the leader of actor and Akar playing the devious commander in chief Field Marshall Amer. Nasser emerged from the 1952 coup as the key leader and 1956, introduced a new constitution that consolidated his power. Erdogan had a head start on political power and managed to complete transformation to authoritarian regime within two years. Just as Amr Nasser’s extended arm to control armed forces, Akar oversaw the military purges and established himself as the intermediary on Erdogan death grip over Turkish Armed Forces.
The similarity does not stop with the actors, after the 1952 coup, the Free Officers went on a purge spree to eliminate all officers that are not aligned with the movement from Egyptian Armed Forces. Field Marshal Amr turned the Egyptian Armed Forces into his private fiefdom, systematically replacing all the top military leaders with cronies loyal to new regime. Air force was hit hardest. By the time Sinai Suez crisis rolled about Egyptian Air Force had only 30 qualified pilots to fly its 120 Mig-15s.EAF was only able to put out a measly 50 sorties of all types in the first day of the conflict on 30 October. The second day was a little better, but there was no third day as British and French airstrikes destroyed most of the operational planes, rest was retrieved to south to spare them from the same eventuality.
Erdogan and Akar followed the footsteps of Nasser and Amr. The Turkish Air Force in early 2016 boasted having one of the most significant air forces in NATO and more importantly being close to 1,5/1pilot/seat fighter manning, nad 180 yearly flight hours training standards set by NATO. Erdogan’s purge claimed 670 trained and experienced pilots in less than a year and bringing down the pilot/seat ration to a shocking 0,3. The result was such devastating that Erdogan had to ask Russia fora in support in operations over Syria despite having 200 modernised F-16s waiting on tarmac.
Just as buying Mig-15’s did little to save Nasser from the repeated embarrassing losses, Erdogan’s acquisition of S-400 and recent interest in buying Su-57 will do little in improving real fighting power of the Turkish Air Force. The student of airpower have repeatedly seen that higher training and better doctrine can be overwhelming despite both sides having similarly capable aircraft. F-35 vs Su-35 or Su-57debate is flawed for Turkey, as the real differences in capability will come from the training and doctrine. The Mig-15 and F-86 were comparable aircraft in Korean war, but that didn’t stop F-86 pilots from achieved 8:1 kill ratio against North Korean and Chinese pilots. Despite having latest Soviet fighter Mig-21 at the time, Nasser’s Air Force got repeatedly obliterated by similarly capable Mirages in 1967 and later 1973.
Equipment can not replace competency, is a lesson hard-learned by the Nasser regime in 1690 and 1970s. Erdogan appears to be on the same track and no doubt will face the same time-honoured lesson
By FATİH YURTSEVER